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call	demographic	 scepticism.		 This	 sceptical	 position	 denies	 that	 demographic	 cultures	 can	
factor	into	metaphysically	plausible	and	empirically	principled	research	projects.	Against	this	
position,	I	claim	that	the	sceptics	overinflate	the	claims	of	empirical	researchers	and	rely	on	a	






Among	 other	 uses,	 “cultures”	 or	 “cultural	 groups”	 are	 used	 as	 an	 explanatory	 category	 in	
comparative	approaches.	These	approaches	explore	cross-cultural	differences	in	psychology	and	
personality	 (cross-cultural	 psychology,	 cultural	 psychology,	 cultural	 evolution);	 life	 history	
strategies	 (evolutionary	 demography,	 evolutionary	 anthropology);	 material	 assemblages	 and	
lifeways	 (archaeology;	 anthropology);	 status,	 symbolism,	 and	 meaning	 (cultural	 sociology);	
ecological,	 political	 and	 religious	 change	 (cultural	 phylogenetics),	 and;	 conflict	 and	 economic	
growth	 (political	 science,	 economics).	 Often	 identifying	 cultural	 groups	with	 nation	 states	 or	
ethnolinguistic	 populations,	 these	 demographic	 cultures	 are	 used	 both	 to	 classify—that	 is,	 to	
identify	a	group	as	a	cultural	group—as	well	as	to	provide	explanations	for	observed	variation	
across	such	groups.		
Worries	about	 the	culture	concept	have	 long	been	 leveraged	to	criticize	 the	classificatory	and	







1. Metaphysics	 and	 ontology:	 the	 metaphysics	 and/or	 ontology	 of	 demographic	 cultures	
renders	them	unable	to	explain	behavior,	let	alone	change	in	behavior.	
2. Variation	 and	 Comparison:	 that	 however	 construed,	 demographic	 cultures	will	 always	



















these	 methods	 are	 not	 widespread	 in	 contemporary	 comparative	 work.	 Not	 only	 are	 these	
methods	 complemented	 by	 a	 range	 of	 different	 ontological	 operationalizations	 and	 empirical	
methods,	but	the	problems	of	latent	variable	approaches	are	well	known	and	manageable.	
My	 arguments	 show	 that	 demographic	 cultures	 are	 both	 metaphysically	 plausible	 and	 can	
support	 empirical	 endeavors.	 Still,	 this	 paper	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 complete	 defense	 of	
contemporary	comparative	work,	nor	prescriptions	for	how	such	work	should	progress.	I	limit	
myself	to	making	three	positive	claims.	First,	comparative	cultural	researchers	recognize	cultural	
change	 as	 necessary	 to	 their	 research	 and	 reject	 metaphysical	 positions	 and	 ontological	
operationalizations	incompatible	with	change.	Second,	there	is	at	least	one	metaphysical	picture	
compatible	with	demographic	cultures	classificatory	efforts.	Third,	the	processes	or	structures	
that	 account	 for	 the	 explanatory	 usefulness	 of	 demographic	 cultures	 need	 not	 be	 the	 same	
structures	or	features	that	account	for	its	classification.	






Though	 comparative	 logic	has	 a	deep	history,	using	 “cultures”	or	 “cultural	 groups”	 to	 explain	
group	differences	is	a	relatively	recent	affair.	It	was	most	firmly	entrenched	in	this	explanatory	
role	 by	 Franz	 Boas	 and	 his	 students,	 especially	 in	 the	 “cultural	 and	 personality”	 work	 of	
interregnum	 and	 wartime	 anthropology.2 	The	 second	world	 war	 consolidated	 this	 role,	 with	
efforts	 like	 George	 Murdock’s	 Human	 Relations	 Area	 Files	 (“HRAF”)	 feeding	 into	 a	 massive	
military	mobilization	efforts	by	provisioning	organized	 information	on	 local	populations.3	The	
HRAF—and	 the	 later-developed	 Ethnographic	 Atlas	 and	 Standard	 Cross	 Cultural	 Sample	
associated	with	the	HRAF—formed	the	basis	of	quantitative	cross-cultural	work	in	the	middle	
20th	century.	Brought	online,	the	eHRAF	database	now	joins	a	number	of	related	ethnographic	
databases	 and	 international	 surveying	 efforts	 that	 increasingly	 underwrite	 contemporary	
comparative	work	on	culture.	


























over	many	years,	Nisbett	 claimed	 that	deep	cultural	differences	existed	between	 “Easterners”	
(broadly,	 those	 in	 East	 Asian	 countries,	 including	 Japan,	 Korea,	 and	 China)	 and	 “Westerners”	
(broadly,	Canada,	 the	United	States,	Australia,	 and	 the	United	Kingdom).	Each	 “culture”	had	a	
distinct,	but	coherent	history	with	contrasting	ontological,	conceptual,	and	linguistic	structures.	




cultures	 is	 meant	 to	 accomplish	 two	 things:	 first,	 to	 show	 that	 demographic	 cultures	 are	 a	











The Folk Anthropological Model 
We	can	best	understand	the	arguments	against	demographic	cultures	by	showing	how	skeptics	
align	 it	with	what	 I	 call	 the	 folk	anthropological	model	of	 culture.	The	general	 idea	of	 the	 folk	
anthropological	model	 is	 that	 cultures	 are	 isolates;	 geographically-bounded	 populations	with	





















Strong	 boundaries:	 cultures	 have	 geographic,	 linguistic,	 commercial,	 and	 ethnic	
boundaries	that	prevent	hybridization	and	diffusion	of	cultural	elements.	










organization	 (‘symbolically	 fused’),	 homogenous	 communalism	 (shared	 ‘values,	 practices,	 and	
interests’),	and	strong	boundaries	(‘entity-like,	bounded’).		
So	aligned,	demographic	skeptics	marshal	convincing	evidence	to	show	that	the	empirical	claims	
made	 about	 populations	 (holistic	 organization,	 homogenous	 communalism,	 and	 strong	
boundaries)	 are	 empirically	 false.	 Even	 deep	 in	 history,	 hominin	 populations	 were	 sites	 of	
significant	diffusion,	change,	and	hybridization.10	Leveraging	these	claims,	skeptics	argue	that	the	




Yet	 why	 call	 this	 folk	 picture	 pernicious?	 Importantly,	 skeptics	 believe	 that	 many	 of	 these	
elements	persist	in	the	public	imagination	and	in	the	research	methods	of	cultural	researchers.	










Yet	 because	 the	 model	 is	 composed	 of	 such	 neat	 and	 distinct	 elements,	 it	 is	 useful	 both	 to	
illuminate	 the	 arguments	 against	 demographic	 cultures,	 as	well	 as	 the	 positive	 arguments	 of	
comparative	researchers.	
In	what	follows,	my	emphasis	is	exploring	the	claim	that	demographic	cultures	are	committed	to	













Metaphysical Problems: A Historical Essentialism and Change 
That	demographic	 cultures	are	problematically	 essentialist	 is	 a	widespread	charge,	 found	not	
only	in	cross-cultural	psychology,	but	also	in	political	philosophy,	anthropology,	and	sociology.13	
Common	 to	 all	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 demographic	 cultures	 are	 committed	 to	 essential,	 “timeless”,	
unchanging	essences.	And	though	the	critics	vary	in	what	they	take	to	be	the	downstream	effects	
of	 this	 essentialism,	 all	 tend	 to	 argue	 that	 essentialism	 underwrites	 implausible	 cultural	
ontologies	and	thus	poor,	inaccurate,	or	unjust	empirical	research.	







atomic	 number—which	 together	 with	 other	 facts	 from	 physics	 and	 chemistry,	 explain	 the	
nominal	properties.		
Claims	about	essentialism	in	comparative	cultural	work	are,	I	contend,	claims	that	demographic	
cultures	 are	 committed	 to	 hidden	 structure	 essentialism.	 Taking	 sceptics	 to	 be	 so	 committed	
helps	 to	 explain	 their	 arguments	 that	 demographic	 cultures	 cannot	 account	 for	 widespread	
change	 (because	 change	 is	 incompatible	 with	 a	 hidden	 structure	 that	 generates	 nominal	
properties),	is	ontologically	fickle	(because	it	requires	positing	new	cultures	with	every	change	
to	 the	hidden	structure),	 and	ontologically	mysterious	 (because	 there	 is	no	agreement	on	 the	
nature	of	the	hidden	structure).	These	also	complicate	the	explanatory	project.	If	essences	are	














characterization	of	 culture	and	empirical	work	 that	deals	with	entities	 that	 vary,	 change,	 and	
hybridize.15 	And	 for	 reasons	 explored	 in	 more	 detail	 below,	 this	 general	 argument	 might	 be	









the	 same	way	 that	 canonical	 examples	 from	 chemistry	 or	 physics	might	 be	microstructural.	 I	 thus	 stick	with	 the	
terminology	elsewhere	used	by	Putnam	of	a	‘hidden	structure’.	




generalizations	 and	 explanatory	 claims	 about	 groups.	 These	 groups	 in	 turn	 will	 have	 some	
features	that	set	them	apart;	they	might	look	a	certain	way	and	do	things	in	a	different	manner.	
We	might	even	be	able	to	explain	these	by	pointing	to	features	like	shared	values	or	practices.	But	




are	 races,	 religions,	 cultures,	 or	 linguistic	 groups.	 And	 while	 not	 borrowing	 Hirschfeld’s	











diffusion	 model	 of	 cultural	 variation,	 we	 find	 that	 very	 simple	 mechanisms	 of	 learning	 and	
evaluation	 (semantic	association,	 “constraint	 satisfaction”)	 can	generate	groups	of	 individuals	
with	similar	clusters	of	traits	(a	“semantic	network”).	But	the	model	itself	makes	no	claims	about	





Moreover,	when	 researchers	 are	 actually	 interrogated	 about	 their	 commitments,	 they	 readily	
acknowledge	the	dynamic	nature	of	culture	and	cultural	change.	This	is	true	even	for	the	cultural	
psychologists	that	form	the	core	target	for	Hirschfeld’s	argument	(Kashima	and	Gelfand	2011).	
This	 should	 lead	 one	 to	 be	 suspicious	 of	 claims	 that	 comparative	 cultural	 work	 is	 somehow	
incompatible	with	cultural	change	and	variation.	While	it	is	possible	that	researchers	might	be	
confused	 about	 their	 own	 metaphysical	 commitments,	 it	 would	 be	 strange	 indeed	 such	
























loaves.	 Bare	 plural	 generics	 (‘bread	 has	 gluten’,	 ‘tigers	 have	 stripes’,	 ‘cultures	 are	 highly	
integrated’)	generate	a	number	of	philosophical	problems	but	are	unproblematically	used	in	both	
ordinary	and	scientific	language	and	reasoning.	For	instance,	researchers	use	bare	plural	generics	




Taken	 together	 these	 considerations	 show	 that	 the	motivations	 for	 aligning	 hidden	 structure	
essentialism	with	demographic	cultures	are	on	shaky	ground.		
	





explanatory).	 Since	 we	 know	 cultures	 change,	 this	 suggests	 either	 that	 hidden	 structure	
essentialism	is	wrong,	or	that	one	must	commit	oneself	to	a	fickle	and	empirically	suspect	picture	
of	cultural	groups.	
There	 are	 two	 routes	 to	 rejecting	 this	 argument:	 one	 which	 supports	 essentialism	 about	
demographic	cultures	and	one	which	doesn’t.	The	first	I’ll	consider	rejects	essentialism—yet	the	
rejection	 is	 informative	 and	 shows	how	an	 amended	 essentialism	might	 satisfy	 the	 problems	
noted	by	the	sceptic.	
First,	 it’s	 important	 to	 recognize	 that	 essentialist	metaphysical	 positions	 are	 compatible	with	
significant	 change.	 Hidden	 structure	 essentialism	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 intrinsic	 essentialism:	 sets	 of	
intrinsic	properties	(like	atomic	number)	serve	as	the	hidden	structure—the	“real	essence”—of	
that	 kind.	 Such	 essentialism	 allows	 for	 all	 non-essential	 intrinsic	 properties	 (“accidental	
properties”)	 to	 vary.	 Depending	 on	 how	 researchers	 draw	 boundaries	 around	 the	 hidden	
structure,	essentialism	might	be	compatible	with	even	substantial	cultural	change.		
Of	 course,	 this	 strategy	 would	 only	 suffice	 if	 the	 essential	 intrinsic	 properties	 could	 be	












Consider	 for	 instance,	Okasha’s	 (2002)	relational	essentialist	approach	 to	species.	Species	are	
what	 they	are	 in	virtue	of	 their	genealogical	relationships	to	other	species.	For	many	sexually	
reproducing	fauna,	we	can	roughly	characterize	this	position	as	saying	that	species	are	particular	



























to	 some	 of	 the	 proposed	 features	 of	 essentialism—admitting	 that	 cultures	 can	 change	 and	








engaged	 in	comparative	work.	As	Hirschfeld	puts	 it,	 there	 is	no	excuse	 for	using	an	“intuitive,	
unscrutinized	notion	as	the	central	concept	in	a	causal	argument.”	(Hirschfeld	2018,	234).	





D’Andrade’s	 formulation	 identifies	 two	problems:	 (i)	a	 lack	of	ontological	 specificity	 about	 the	
nature	of	culture	and	(ii)	a	clear	causal-explanatory	link	between	culture	and	human	behavior.	As	
he	puts	it,	“Unless	there	is	some	specification	of	how	culture	“makes”	people	do	what	they	do,	no	

















articulating	 their	 subject	 matter.	 But	 this	 should	 be	 unsurprising.	 It	 is	 hard	 to	 provide	 an	
exhaustive	and	detailed	description	of	what	culture	 is,	given	that	 it	 is	embedded	in	a	range	of	
material	vehicles,	behavioral	expressions,	vocalizations,	institutions,	and	social	roles.	Yet	while	it	
is	difficult	to	provide	detailed	and	encompassing	operationalizations	of	all	the	ways	that	culture	
is	 instantiated,	 this	 doesn’t	mean	 researchers	 lack	 ontological	 operationalizations	 altogether.	
Indeed,	 many	 researchers	 seem	 to	 arrive	 at	 ontological	 operationalizations	 by	 adopting	
something	 like	 a	 “Quinean”	 strategy:	 working	 back	 from	 successful	 explanations	 (those	 that	












1992)	 can	 also	 be	 found	 elsewhere;	 in	 cultural	 evolution	 (Henrich	 2015);	 sociology	 (Axelrod	
1997;	 Goldberg	 and	 Stein	 2018);	 and	 archaeology	 (O’Brien	 and	 Lyman	 2002).	 Beyond	 this,	
philosophers	have	identified	a	range	of	candidate	ontologies	for	culture	in	their	surveys	of	the	
anthropological	literature	(Risjord	2016),	with	practice-based	ontologies	finding	adherents	in	the	




who	 identify	 culture	 with	 “information”	 tend	 to	 identify	 cultural	 groups	 with	 a	 particular	
“informational	pool”.	This	 is	particularly	prevalent	 in	areas	of	 sociology,	and	 the	evolutionary	
human	sciences.	In	evolutionary	anthropology,	economics,	and	political	science,	cultural	groups	
are	 frequently	 identified	with	 ethnolinguistic	 populations—that	 is,	 informational	 accounts	 of	
culture	 are	 complemented	 by	 boundaries	 drawn	 around	 populations	 with	 shared	 biological	
ancestry.	And	as	noted	 above,	 in	philosophy,	Patten’s	 (2014)	 social	 lineage	 account	 identifies	
cultural	groups	with	lineages	of	institutional	control.		
“Culture”	 and	 “cultural	 groups”	 may	 not	 always	 be	 clearly	 operationalized	 terms.	 Some	
researchers	 may	 lack	 clear	 operationalizations	 altogether.	 But	 we	 must	 not	 confuse	 such	
researchers	as	being	 representative	of	 those	who	employ	 comparative	approaches	 to	 culture.	
Many	of	these	have	clear	and	well-defined	operationalizations	for	both	“culture”	and	“cultural	
groups”.	Though	these	evince	different	ontological	commitments,	philosophers	of	science	have	






Explanatory Concerns  





















variable	 approaches	 to	 culture—and	more	 specifically,	when	 these	 approaches	 bootstrap	 the	
latent	variables	they	identify	into	an	ontological	claim	about	the	nature	or	“hidden	structure”	of	





variables.	 Scientists	 and	 researchers	 employ	 any	 number	 of	 methods	 to	 extract	 such	 latent	
variables	(factor	analysis,	principal	components	analysis),	which	function	both	to	decrease	the	
dimensionality	 of	 data	 and	 in	 some	 case	 represent	 candidate	 hypotheses	 about	 causal	
relationships.	Familiar	latent	variables	include	Spearman’s	g	(the	“general	intelligence	factor”)	
and	the	“Big	Five”	personality	traits.		
This	 kind	 of	 approach	 has	 a	 long	 history	 in	 comparative	 cultural	 work.	 Anthropologists	 like	
Margaret	Mead,	Ruth	Benedict,	and	Geoffrey	Gorer—researchers	associated	with	the	“culture	and	
personality”	 school,	 mentioned	 above—often	 made	 quite	 grandiose	 claims	 about	 the	 shared	
values	 and	 personalities	 of	 different	 cultural	 groups.	 These	 explanations	were	 psychological,	
often	psychoanalytical	in	nature,	and	often	more	than	a	little	speculative.	Drawing	on	evidence	
from	 literature,	 limited	 sociological	 data,	 and	 interviews	 with	 immigrants,	 these	 researchers	
linked	 observable	 features	 to	 deep	 “personality”	 constructs	 that	 structured	 group	 behavior.		










“individualistic”	 a	 culture	 is—might	 correlate	with	 an	 explain	 a	 host	 of	 other	 behaviors	 (e.g.	
Triandis	1995;	Gelfland	2018).	My	concern	is	not	with	the	shared-values	approach	in	general,	but	




















“Scholars	 were	 generally	 not	 concerned	 with	 construct	 specification	 because	 they	
presumed	 culture	 was	 a	 latent	 variable	 that	 they	 could	 study	 using	 any	 number	 of	
indicators.	This	produced	a	loose	conceptualization	of	the	concept	as	a	people’s	way	of	
life	 with	 a	 corresponding	 group-level	 unit	 of	 analysis	 […].	 This	 analytic	 and	
methodological	 approach	 led	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 culture	 is	 shared,	 consensual,	 and	




consistently	 shown	 that	 there	 is	 more	 variability	 in	 values	 within	 groups—especially	 nation	
states—than	across	them	(Oyserman	et	al.	2002;	Lenartowicz	et	al.	2003;	Fisher	and	Schwartz	









Let’s	 not	 lose	 sight	 of	 the	 larger	 point.	 Value	 consensus	 models	 are	 not	 reflective	 of	 all	
comparative	approaches	to	classifying	and	explaining	culture.	They	exists	alongside	sophisticated	
informational	or	practice-based	ontologies,	and	methods	of	network	analyses	(e.g.	Goldberg	and	
Stein	 2018);	 database-driven	 approaches	 to	 sociocultural	 history	 (Turchin	 et	 al.	 2015;	
Slingerland	 et	 al.	 2020);	 cultural	 group	 selection	 models	 (Richerson	 et	 al.	 2015);	 and	 other	
psychological	and	sociological	methods.	Moreover,	the	methodological	and	empirical	failings	of	





















within	and	create	 conditions	 for	 traits	 to	 spread.22	It	 just	 so	happens	 that	 those	 traits	 that	do	
spread	 are	 more	 cultural—and,	 often,	 more	 empirically	 interesting—than	 those	 that	 don’t.		
Picking	up	on	a	widespread	example	in	the	cultural	epidemiological	literature,	Hirschfeld	gives	
the	example	of	the	story	of	Little	Red	Riding	Hood:	
“What	 makes	 Little	 Red	 Riding	 Hood	 cultural	 is	 the	 convergence	 of	 constraints	 on	
transformations	 inherent	 in	 communication,	 the	 evocation	 of	 a	 “catchy”	 narrative	
structure,	 and	 a	 suite	 of	 memory	 and	 relevance	 functions.	 The	 cultural	 environment	










accounts	 that	 explain	 their	 distribution	 in	 populations.	 Value	 consensus	models—and	maybe	
other	 cross-cultural	 comparative	 methods—fail	 insofar	 as	 they	 lack	 clear	 mechanistic	
explanations.		





21 	For	 surveys	 of	 the	 cultural	 sociological	 methods,	 see	 Mohr	 et	 al.	 (2020);	 for	 a	 similar	 survey	 of	 the	 cultural	
evolutionary	literature,	see	Henrich	(2015).		
22	Again,	Hirschfeld	 (2018)	provides	a	 remarkably	 clear	articulator	of	 this	position:	 “The	notion	of	 community	 (or	
cultural	 environment)	 as	 I	 am	 using	 it	 makes	 no	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 a	 community	 beyond	 its	
epidemiological	properties	(again,	to	evoke	Sperber’s	notion	of	epidemiology	of	representations).	What	is	of	concern	
is	whether	and	how	ideas,	practices,	and	institutions	become	catchy,	or	not.”	(249)		









individuals	 are	 statistical	 outliers	 on	 a	 range	 of	 metrics:	 they	 are	 more	 individualistic	 and	
meritocratic,	inordinately	trusting	of	strangers,	motivated	by	fairness,	and	“analytic”	in	reasoning	
(Henrich	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Henrich	 2020;	 Muthukrishna	 et	 al.	 2020).	 Extrapolating	 from	 WEIRD	





Intensity	 Index	 (“KII”).	 This	 is	 an	 aggregate	 measure	 that	 draws	 from	 Ethnographic	 Atlas—
another	cross-cultural	survey	associated	with	George	Murdock	and	the	HRAF—that	combines	a	












marriage—agents	 live	 in	 “individual-centered	 worlds”	 with	 “greater	 independence,	 less	





package	 of	 ecclesiastical	 and	 legal	 decisions	 by	 the	 Catholic	 church	 which	 simultaneously	
outlawed	cousin	marriage	to	an	unusual	degree	and	boosted	a	package	of	ideas	supporting	the	









Henrich’s	work	 raises	 an	 important	 consideration.	He	 takes	 demographic	 cultures	mostly	 for	













on	 notions	 of	 ancestry	 to	 ground	 the	 essence	 of	 species—placing	 them	 in	 appropriate	




The	 same	 might	 be	 true	 for	 demographic	 cultures.	 While	 relational	 essentialism	 might	 be	
important	to	classifying	cultures,	the	explanation	of	salient	features	of	those	groups	might	appeal	
to	 different	 sets	 of	 facts	 and	 standards	 of	 application.	 Institutions	 like	 kinship	 structures,	 for	
instance,	 might	 help	 explain	 why	 one	 sees	 the	 clustering	 of	 particular	 norms,	 beliefs,	 and	
practices.	As	the	case	of	species	shows,	this	separation	of	explanatory	and	classificatory	function	
shouldn’t	trouble	us.		
Overall,	 I	 think	 this	 paper	 has	 shown	 why	 demographic	 cultures	 are	 not	 troubled	 by	 the	
metaphysical,	 ontological,	 and	 explanatory	 claims	 of	 the	 skeptic.	 Intrinsic	 “hidden	 structure”	
essentialism	may	 be	 incompatible	 with	 empirical	 research	 on	 cultural	 groups,	 but	 relational	
essentialism	 can	 ground	 the	 classificatory	 work	 of	 comparative	 work	 on	 culture.	 This	
metaphysical	picture	is	in	turn	compatible	with	a	wide	range	of	operationalizations	of	“culture”	
and	 “cultural	 groups”.	 Though	 these	 operationalizations	 might	 have	 competing	 ontological	
commitments,	this	in	itself	does	not	render	projects	employing	demographic	cultures	(or	culture	
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